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Abstract 
One dimension of Internet security is web application security. The 
purpose of this Design-science study was to design, build and 
evaluate a computer-based tool to support security vulnerability and 
risk assessment in the early stages of web application design . The 
tool facilitates risk assessment by managers and helps developers to 
model security requirements using an interactive tree diagram. The 
tool calculates residual risk for each component of a web application 
and for the application overall so developers are provided with 
better information for making decisions about which 
countermeasures to implement given limited resources for doing so. 
The tool supports taking a proactive approach to building in web 
application security at the requirements stage as opposed to the 
more common reactive approach of putting countermeasures in 
place after an attack and loss have been incurred. The primary 
contribution of the proposed tool is its ability to make known 
security-related information (e.g. known vulnerabilities. attacks and 
countermeasures) more accessible to developers who are not 
security experts and to translate lack of security measures into an 
understandable measure of relative residual risk. The latter is useful 
for managers who need to prioritize security spending. 
Keywords: web application security, security requirements 
modelling, attack trees, threat trees, risk assessment. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background 
1. 1 Introduction 
The security of web appl ications has become a central issue for online businesses. 
The e-Crime Watch Survey (2004) fo und that 40% of businesses feel hackers 
represent their greatest cyber security threat (CSO magazine. 2004). The 2006 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu G lobal Security urvey of top financial institutions 
recently reported a sh ift from infrastructure to app li cation layer attacks (p. 35) as we ll 
as the fol lowing findings. Only 7 percent conduct quarterly security code reviews. 2 
percent do emi-annual reviews. 65 percent do ad hoc reviews and 13 percent never 
do revicvvs. The number of online attacks reported in this an nual survey grew by 25 
percent with 78 percent reporting security breaches from external attacks. In the J\sia-
Pacific region. excluding Japan. the number or on line attacks grew from 16 percent in 
2005 to 100 percent in 2006: every organisation surveyed in the Asia-Pacific region 
had been attacked a minimum of once during the 12 month period (Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu. 2006). As current web sites are more likely to be complex online 
information systems and not just simple I ITML pages. web site security has become 
more complicated . The security of a web si te has a number of dimensions: one or 
them is web application security. John Pescatore. an analy t at Gartner Inc. in 
Stamford. Connecticut said .. \\'Cb application security is a serious problem for tv;o-
thirds of all corporate web sites·· (Yerton. 2002. p. 9). Unfortunately. the growth in 
security problems is keeping pace with growth in the number or Internet users and 
companies using web sites to carry out business on line. 
In contrast to the predominantly reactive security practise of detecting and correcting 
web appl ication security problems, thi s thesis work seeks to design and develop a tool 
to support web application developers in taking a proactive approach to building in 
web application security at the requirements stage. The IT community knows about 
countermeasures. security patterns, a ttack patterns and existing vulnerabilities but 
people are still developing web applications which are not secure. To solve this 
problem, there is a need to make this information more access ible. Since managers 
must sec a reason to invest in security measures. the abi lity to more effectively assess 
risk and the potential loss of not implementing security is needed. This research has 
designed and prototyped a too l that provides support to both managers and developers 
in making these tough deci sions. 
1. 2 Research Objectives and Contributions 
The Design Science research approach has been taken (Gregg, Kulkarn i, & Yinze, 
2001; Hevner & March, 2003: Hevner, March, Park, & Ram. 2004: Zelkowitz & 
Wallace, 1998) in order to achieve the following research objectives: 
Objective I : To design and prototype a tool for use by managers and 
developers for visua liz ing and evaluating security trade-offs and ri sks in 
alternative web application designs. 
Objective 2: To demonstrate the utility of the tool via evaluation in a real web 
applicat ion development environment. Util ity has been measured in terms of 
user satisfaction with the tool's ability to support risk assessment and to 
facilitate identification o r vulnerabi lities during the requirements stage. 
The proposed solution is a tool for visualizing and evaluating security trade-offs in 
alternative web app lication des igns. The tool is designed to help developers visualize 
attack patterns and build threat trees in order to identify potential vulnerabi lity points 
in web applications. It also provides the abi lity to assess risk and to identify trade-offs 
in order to determine which security requirements should take priority. The tool can 
generate visual representations of attacks and vulnerabi lities for different kinds of web 
applications to help developers identify and prioritise security requirements rather 
than reacting to security problems after they happen. 
The prototype tool stores information on language independent web application 
vulnerabil ities. Any language-specific problems are deli mited to web appli cations 
written using PHP and the MySQL database. To get businesses to take proactive 
security measures more serious ly we need to reduce the up front cost for security risk 
analysis. There is a need to reduce the learning curve and improve access to existing 
knowledge about potential threats, web application vulnerabilities, countermeasures 
and potential losses from not implementing countermeasures. 
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1. 3 Background to the Study 
The May 2007 etcraft survey reported the existence of 118,023.363 web sites. an 
increase o f 12.8 million from the 2006 total of 30. 9 million (Netcraft Ltd. 2007). The 
current state of security of such sites was underlined by Auronen (2002. p. 2) who 
stated that sensitive data is .. usually protected by only weak access control 
mechanisms vulnerable to many types of attack··. Database dri ven web applications 
are the heart of today's web sites. Given their central role. security requirements 
should be considered from the initial stage of web appl ication deve lopment. Writing 
code with security in mind could he lp to make web sites more secure against a wide 
variety of known attacks. However. a 2006 survey of top financial institutions around 
the world by Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu shows only 26 percent of respondents named 
application security as a top priority. 56 percent of respondents stated that poor 
software development compromises quality and may become a security threat in the 
future (Dc loitte Touche Tohmatsu. 2006). 
Potential for exposure must be continually as cssed during the iterative process or 
web appli cation development to ensure changes don' t introduce new vulnerab ilities 
and to ensure that protection exists from newly discovered types of attacks. Security 
breaches can affect the organisation that owns the web site. but can have an even 
greater impact on customers when private information is revea led or financial losses 
arc incurred (Schneier. 2004 ). 
ecurity assessment should be thought of as an ongoing process. not a one shot 
acc ident according to the Open Web Application ecurity Project (OW/\. P. 2005c). 
This process includes a number of steps. First of all it is necessary to define and know 
your enemy - vulnerabilities of web appl ications. Organisations such as the 
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) o ften publish known vulnerabi lities. 
A list of the ten most dangerous can be found at OW ASP (2005b ). The second step is 
taking a proactive approach to ensure security, like bui lding security into the design of 
web applications. The remaining steps are reactive. They include monitoring web site 
activity regu larly and using this information to maintain running web applications in 
terms of security enhancements to ensure changes in requirements will not 
compromise security. Figure 1.1 shows a set of best security practices, meant to be 
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followed during software development. This research focuses on two early stages of 
web application development: security requirements and risk analysis, highlighted in 
Figure 1.1. The study produced a prototype of a software-based security tool to 
support these two stages. The tool brings together existing security knowledge to 
reduce the effort required to conduct risk assessments for web applications. 
Abuse 
cases 
Use 
cases 
Proposed tool 
Security 
requirements 
Risk 
Design 
Requirements 
Proactive Approach 
External 
review 
Risk-base 
secur:ity test 
Test 
plans 
Static 
analysis 
(tools) 
Risk 
Code Test 
results 
Penetration 
testing 
Field 
feedback 
Reactive Approach 
Figure 1.1 Best security practices for software development. 
Adapted from: (McGraw, 2004) 
An extension of the model shown in Figure 1.1 is illustrated in Figure 1.2 (Barnum 
and McGraw, 2005) . The extension points out specific types of security knowledge 
(e.g. principles) and identifies the security activities (e.g. risk analysis) in the software 
development life cycle (e.g. design stage) where the knowledge is likely to be of 
greatest use. An understanding of these relationships provides a solid base for 
software security best practice. This becomes extremely important in practical 
software development given the industry faces a shortage of experienced security 
experts (Barnum & McGraw, 2005). Barnum and McGraw define three knowledge 
categories : prescriptive, diagnostic, and historical. The prescriptive knowledge 
category includes actions or procedures which need to be followed, like data 
principles, guidelines, and rules. Attack patterns, exploits, and vulnerabilities help in 
determining the capability of a component to perform its functions and are therefore 
classified as diagnostic knowledge. Prior diagnostic knowledge helps the practitioner 
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to understand the real problem based on extensive expenence with the same or a 
similar problem. Common security problems like vulnerabilities and corresponding 
attacks can be detected and dealt with using prior experience with these problems. 
This category of knowledge helps in recognising common problems and is invaluable 
during the development stage. Information that helps to define previously existing 
risks belongs to the historical knowledge category (Barnum & McGraw, 2005). In 
relationship to Figure 1. 1, this research seeks to design a tool which supports the 
definition of security requirements in terms of vulnerabilities, known attacks on each 
type of vulnerability and known countermeasures to reduce the potential damage from 
an attack. The tool provides a database of vulnerabilities. attacks and countermeasures 
to support doing a risk assessment in the early stages of web application development. 
The tool calculates the risk for each component of the web application being assessed 
and stores this information so it will be available for managers to view at later dates 
for the purposes of doing what-if analyses and making comparisons between different 
risk mitigation strategies in terms of residual risk (i .e. unmitigated risk) and the costs 
associated with implementing countermeasures. 
Different types of security knowledge can trigger security activities at different stages 
of software development . Conducting security assessment activities during the early 
stages of development is referred to as the proactive approach. Knowledge about 
attack patterns can be applied at the requirements and design stages to conduct risk 
assessments . This knowledge is also useful at the test plan creation stage for running 
risk based security tests. Figure 1.2 claims knowledge about vulnerabilities is only 
used in the later stages of development. In reality, vulnerability knowledge can also be 
useful in the early stages of web application development as part of a proactive 
approach. In contrast, a reactive approach seeks to discover vulnerabilities in the code 
after it has been released. A proactive approach seeks to prevent or reduce 
vulnerability (i.e. weaknesses) in the code during development. Developers need to 
have knowledge of potential vulnerabilities and attacks before they can consider 
countermeasures to reduce or remove vulnerabilities. Knowing about vulnerabilities 
before coding helps to save time at later stages where these identified problems can 
cause significant delays in further development and/or releasing the software. 
Knowledge about attack patterns can assist developers in writing security 
requirements and in providing protection against particular identified attacks. This 
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knowledge can also be used to write risk-based security tests. A principle is defined 
as a statement of existing security knowledge. which comes from an experienced 
practitioner and from real-world knowledge of building secure systems (Barnum & 
McGraw, 2005). Principles are helpful in two ways: in detecting architectural defects 
in software. and in promoting good security practices. A principle is often 
documented using a title, description, examples, references, related rules and 
guidelines. Guidelines can be useful for creating security requirements and evaluating 
a lternative designs (See Figure 1.2.) 
Security 
requirements / 
' 
Abu se I ,' I 
I ' 
I ,' 
1, :_/ 
I ,,,--( 
\ /'[ :' 
v 1 ' 
Principles 
" 
\ .. E.xtern,11 _/ 
Risk 
,m,1lvs1s 
rE-v 1 ew 
Guidelines 
R1s~- b .1sed 
secu nty tE-sts 
~ 
St,ltic / Penetr,1t1on 
,rnJIVS IS y testing 
(tools) /~ 1 
,11~~~s i s ~ I Secu rity I' breJ~s 
\ t ""x ,· 
/~. l / Field Test I \ ,. 
1 • / feedback 
resu Its; \ ; 
\ I .--~\ ~'~/ ___, 
Vulnerabilities Exploits 
Figure 1.2 Applying security knowledge during the software deve lopment life cycle. 
Source: (Barnum & McGraw. 2005, p.3) 
Historical ri sks are detailed catalogues with descriptions of specific issues which were 
discovered in real-world software development. For example, a list o f di scovered 
software vulnerabilities (i .e. weaknesses) is a type of historical risk. Each risk item of 
this catalogue has a statement of impact on the business. Historical knowledge can 
become a valuable security resource, which helps to identify similar issues in new 
software development. A catalogue of historical knowledge can save developers time 
and effort in identifying potential security issues. The proposed tool makes a database 
of historical security information available to web application developers. 
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Gathering and interpreting available data on vulnerabilities can be an onerous task, 
taking a considerable amount of a developer's or analyst's time. The old proverb: "A 
picture is worth a thousand words·· implies people may absorb complex information 
more readily from pictures than from large volumes of text. Visual representations of 
complex relationships amongst web application components, their vulnerabilities, 
attacks based on these vulnerabilities. and the magnitude of potential losses can 
quickly highlight areas of major concern, facilitating security requirements analysis 
and risk assessment. 
1.3.1 Risk 
Security assessment is often associated with the concept of risk . Risk can be viewed 
as a function of the likelihood that a threat will materialise, the level of vulnerability 
and the potential for loss of resources. Thinking about negative scenarios in these 
terms is an essential skill for a test engineer (Alexander, 2003). In this sense. a web 
application designer should also think about requirements in terms of negative 
scenarios. that is, from a hacker·s point of view. An understanding of vulnerability. 
threats and attacks is relevant to risk measurement (Amoroso. 1994) where: 
• A vulnerability is a characteristic (or weakness) of the software that makes it 
possible for a threat to occur. 
• A threat can be defined as an event which can have an undesirable effect on 
assets and resources (e.g., loss of data, corruption of data, exposure of 
confidential information) . 
• An attack is an action by a malicious user that involves exploiting 
vulnerabilities in order to cause a threat to occur. 
Vulnerability and attacks are only of concern if they introduce the potential for threats 
that would involve significant resource loss (Amoroso, 1994). If you increase any of 
these three variables, risk also increases. If you reduce them, it decreases . More 
formally risk has also been defined as " the probability of a vulnerability being 
exploited in the current environment, leading to a degree of loss of confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability, of an asset" (Microsoft Corporation, 2006b, p.27). The 
potential impact of a threat is related to the degree of a resource's vulnerability as well 
as the resource or asset's value. The higher the value of an asset, the greater the 
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potential loss will be from reali sation of a threat, and consequently the higher the 
degree of ri sk (Amoroso, 1994 ). 
Risk needs to be assessed and managed. Microsoft Corporation recently published a 
document called ··The Security Ri sk Management Guide'· (2006). The document 
outlines an iterative, four phase (i.e. assessing risk, conducting decision support, 
implementing controls and measuring program effectiveness) proactive approach to 
ri sk management based on industry standards. The goal of Microson·s approach is to 
balance cost and e ffectiveness. Qualitative steps for identifying the most important 
ri sks are followed using a process wh ich starts with identifying roles and 
responsibi lities. Managers arc responsible for assessing asset value and potential 
impact of a ri sk. security personnel are responsible for identifying the li kel ihood of a 
ri sk occurring by taking current and proposed countermeasures/controls into 
consideration and deve lopers are responsible for implementing the countermeasures 
fo r risks identified as unacceptable. In this gu ide, ri sk management is defined as "the 
overall effo11 to manage risk to an acceptable level across the business'· and ri sk 
assessment is defined as "the process to identify and prioritize risks to the business .. 
(Microsoft Corporati on, 2006b, p. 16). 
Similarly, Boehm ( 199 1) identified the two main stages of risk management as ri sk 
assessment and risk control (Boehm, 199 1 ). Risk assessment includes ri sk 
identification, ri sk analysis, and risk prioriti zation w here (Boehm, 1991): 
• Ri sk ident ificati on results in a list of project-specific vulnerabilities which can 
be dangerous fo r a project 
• Ri sk analysis assesses the loss probability and loss magnitude for each 
vulnerability and 
• Ri sk prioritisation ranks the risks 111 order of those to be dealt with 111 
descending order of urgency. 
Today, most organisations understand the importance of risk management and 
assessment but still experience difficulty with the application of model ling techniques 
to both risk management and ri sk assessment. One reason it is difficult to utilise these 
techniques, is the lack of advice on what to do and how to do it. Security analysts can 
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define vulnerability. but it can be difficult to see the overall picture with respect to 
evaluating the impact in terms of costs incurred for either choosing to mitigate or not 
mitigate specific threats associated with specific vulnerabili ties. It is rare for an 
organization at the project management or portfolio level to use a ri sk management 
tool or framewo rk to assess a risk. and identify its impact (Steven. 2006). 
Organizations need more accurate in formation and more accessible info rmation for 
risk assessment. The right information should be present in a fami liar way and be easy 
for non-security experts to use. A risk calculation in these terms can give a business 
an improved ability to make better decisions on how much to spend in order to 
achie e a desired level of security ( teven. 2006). umbers are not magic. but with 
the right info rmation from experts they can serve as advisory indicators fo r a security 
decision. Serious application level security problems are sti ll present in pro fessionally 
designed web applications. To address web application security problems. dcc ision-
support too ls and techniques are needed (Scott & harp. 2003 ). 
1. 3. 2 Why software tools for risk assessment are needed 
Proactive approaches to security invo lve consideration of the risk leve l which in turn 
depends on the likelihood of pa11icular threats, the potential fo r loss. the effort 
required to execute particular kinds of attacks and the leve l or vulnerabi li ty as well as 
dependencies between these factors. The fo llowing sections summari se key aspects 
of the need fo r software tools to support ri sk a sessment. as a part of a proactive 
security practice. ··security is a process. not a product. but we still need accurate and 
reliable products to calculate security quantitati ve ly to improve security'. ( ahinoglu, 
2005, p. 23) . Security should not be treated as an add-on feature. Security should be 
considered from the requirements stage, as a key system requirement, especially fo r 
systems that utilise components in both public and private networks. A ll possible 
security requirements can not usually be implemented , because avail able resources are 
limited. Every software project has limitations in terms of available time, budget and 
expertise. A change in mindset is required where the following points are considered 
(Feather, Si gal, Cornford, & Hutchinson, 200 I) : 
• quality and risk estimation can be as important as budget and schedule 
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• limited project resources should be more optimally allocated, 
• trade-off opportunities should be identified and evaluated 
To achieve more optimal allocation of resources, managers need better information 
and more cost-effective ways of analysing that information. It is important for 
managers to understand the potential costs of not implementing countermeasures in 
order for them to make more informed decisions about allocating limited resources to 
security measures. In addition, security issues become more understandable to a 
business when they are expressed in familiar form. The question of "What data needs 
to be collected and what needs to be measured?'" arises. Security risk assessment 
tools can provide decision support for managers who aim to balance the cost of a loss 
with the cost of countermeasures. Business leaders should ask the following questions 
about security (Geer, H.oo, & Jaquith, 2003): 
• How secure am I? 
• Am I better off than I was this time last year? 
• How do I compare with my peers? 
• Am I spending the right amount of money? 
• What are my risk-transfer options? (Geer et al., 2003) 
Due to the nature of the Internet, web based systems are vulnerable to outsider and 
insider threats. A number of reasons why web based systems are vulnerable include 
(Zhou, 2002): 
• Web-based information systems can be accessed by any Internet user. 
• System applications can be invisible and difficult to review. 
• Unauthorised access can be hard to trace. 
• The possibility of security breaches in web information systems is higher than 
in centralised systems. The effects can be costly: systems can be destroyed and 
sensitive information can be stolen. 
• Data records can be accessed indirectly and modified by unauthorised persons. 
• Numbers of attacks are rising due to two factors: the Internet is now widely 
available and many financial systems are now linked to the Internet (e.g. 
online banking, online trading). 
To address security across a software project's lifecycle a number of factors need to be 
considered. They include security requirements specification from the viewpoints of 
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various stakeholders, specification of the environment m which the software will 
operate, specification of the software and hardware modules, and specification of the 
expected length of time the software will be used. The recent interest shown by 
companies such as Microsoft in the development of new security tools for the analysis 
and modelling of security requirements for web applications reveals a change in 
attitudes towards web application security in the industry. A computer-based security 
analysis tool can be a valuable aid to the process of risk assessment. Such a tool can 
provide assistance in the evaluation of which software risks need to be addressed first , 
helping to mitigate risk, and show the effectiveness of countermeasures (D.P. Gilliam, 
2004). 
1. 4 Overview of the Thesis 
This chapter outlined a current problem with web application security, namely the 
need to think about security early on and to make existing knowledge about 
vulnerabilities, attacks and countermeasures more accessible to developers and their 
managers so they can conduct risk assessments. In addition. the research objectives 
were stated and a brief background provided on why such a study is needed and who 
might benefit from the outcomes. Chapter 2 outlines the nature of the Design Science 
research method and explains why it is an appropriate approach for achieving the 
research objectives. The second chapter begins with a discussion of the generic steps 
in the Design Science research method then continues with specific details on how 
this research was done. Iteration through the design process, the changes made to the 
prototype after each cycle through the process, details on how the tool was evaluated 
and, how the findings led to prototype changes, as well as the steps involved in the 
implementation of changes are discussed. The remaining chapters are organised 
based on the steps and outcomes of the Design Science research method. 
Chapter 3 discusses the proposed security tool ' s functional and non-functional 
requirements. Requirements are defined as what a system must do. They describe a 
necessary attribute, capability, characteristic, or quality in order to provide value for 
the tool ' s intended users (Sommerville, 2007). Functional requirements are necessary 
application related capabilities in terms of what the system should be able to do for 
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the user. Non-functional requirements arc quality aspects such as usability, 
performance, reliability and safety. Chapter 4 discusses the tool's architecture and the 
detailed design of its major components. Chapter 5 presents the results of three rounds 
of external evaluations of the tool in terms of its ability to meet the requirements 
stated in Chapter 3. Chapter 6 relates this study to prior work and compares the 
proposed tool to two similar security analysis tools. This chapter also discusses how 
the positive and negative results from the final evaluation led to implications for the 
use of the tool in practice by different groups of users. Finally, Chapter 7 briefly 
restates the contributions of this research, discusses the limitations of the tool and 
draws implications for further research based on the identified limitations. 
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